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Abstract
Objective: In recent years there has been a proliferation of patient safety policies in the United Kingdom triggered by well
publicized failures in health care. The Learning from Deaths (LfD) policy was implemented in response to failures at Southern
Health National Health Service (NHS) Foundation Trust. This study aims to develop a narrative to enable the understanding
of the key drivers involved in its evolution and implications for future national patient safety policy development.
Methods: A qualitative study was undertaken using documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews (n¼ 12) with
policymakers from organizations involved in the design, implementation and assurance of LfD at a system level. Kingdon’s
Multiple Streams Approach was used to frame the policymaking process.
Results: The publication of the Southern Health independent review and subsequent highlighting by the Care Quality
Commission of a fragmented approach to learning from deaths across the NHS opened a ‘policy window.’ Under the
influence of the families affected by patient safety failures and the then Secretary of State, acting as ‘policy entrepreneurs,’
recently developed methods for mortality review were combined with mechanisms to enhance transparency and gov-
ernance. This rapidly created a framework designed to ensure NHS organizations identified remedial safety problems
and could be accountable for addressing them.
Conclusions: The development of LfD exhibits several common features with other patient safety policies in the NHS.
It was triggered by a crisis and the need for a prompt political response and attempts to address a range of concerns
related to safety. In common with other safety policies, LfD contains inherent tensions related to its primary purpose,
which may hinder its impact. In the absence of formal evaluations of these policies, deeper understanding of the
policymaking process offers the possibility of identifying potential barriers to goal achievement.
Keywords
learning from deaths, multiple streams approach, policy entrepreneurs
Introduction
In the United Kingdom (UK), over the last 20 years,
there has been a proliferation of patient safety policy
initiatives, performance measurement approaches and
campaigns emanating from government, regulators and
professional bodies. The history of patient safety in the
UK clearly shows that against a backdrop of incremen-
tal efforts to improve the surveillance and management
of safety across the National Health Service (NHS), it
is often the impact of high profile health care scandals
and the initiatives in response that lead to changes in
policy direction.1
The Bristol inquiry into deaths of children with car-
diac problems identified a hierarchical culture with lim-
ited attempts to learn from failures.2 The proposed
solution was greater transparency across the NHS
through the publication of comparable mortality sta-
tistics. The Mid Staffordshire inquiry revealed a reluc-
tance from the organization to heed concerns raised by
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families and a lack of transparency when issues arose.
This led to the Duty of Candour (DoC), a mandatory
requirement for NHS staff to be open with families
when failings in care arise.3
It is therefore unsurprising that development of
national policy often diverges from a linear, rational,
evidence-based process to follow a multifaceted and
expedient approach, responsive to political and public
demand for action. Gaining understanding of how
policy is formed in relation to the specific circumstan-
ces and competing influences present during the
decision-making process enables prediction of both
positive impacts and potential negative consequences.
In March 2017, the NHS National Quality Board
(NQB) published the Learning from Deaths (LfD)
Framework. This followed a review by the national
regulator for health and social care services (Care
Quality Commission (CQC)), which highlighted poor
systems across the NHS for organizational learning
from deaths.4,5 Acute, community and mental health
NHS Trusts were required to have their own LfD
policy, based on the guidance, in place by September
2017. Organizations were expected to employ a system-
atic approach to reviewing deaths, to develop mortality
governance and to engage with families of the bereaved
(Table 1). In this study, we will develop a narrative
account of the LfD framework using Kingdon’s
Multiple Streams Approach (MSA),8 to enable us,
through examination of its formulation, to consider
the importance of patient safety focused policy agen-
das, changing priorities over time, prompts to action
and consequences for potential impacts.
Methods
Conceptual framework
The MSA conceptualizes policy agenda setting as com-
prising three streams. The ‘problem stream’ represents
perceptions of public problems that are seen as requir-
ing government intervention to address them. The
‘policy stream’ considers proposals for change, the
potential solutions that emerge before problems reach
the decision-making agenda. The ‘political stream’
comprises factors that shape rhetoric around problems
and solutions, such as swings in national mood or cam-
paigning from interest groups. These three streams may
proceed independently of one another until at a specific
point at which a ‘policy window’ may open, enabling a
convergence. Window openings may be created by
major events but may also be capitalized upon by
‘policy entrepreneurs’, who influence policy outcomes,
sometimes for their own agenda.
Study design
This study comprised two main components: analysis of
relevant documents (Table 2) and semi-structured inter-
views with policymakers and other relevant stakeholders
(n¼ 12).We selected reports from 2001 (publication of the
Bristol inquiry)2 to March 2017 (publication of LfD), a
period marked by growing public and political awareness
of threats to health care quality.We focused ondocuments
that identified drivers of patient safety policy especially in
relation to mortality. The documentary analysis was
informed by the relevant academic literature associated
with mortality and safety in health care organizations.9–13
We purposively sampled policymakers from the
Department ofHealth and Social Care as well as executive
bodies including NHS England (NHSE) and
Improvement and the CQC to participate in semi-
structured interviews. Our approach in formulating a nar-
rative of the evolution of LfD meant that we initially
selected individuals who we identified as being directly
involved in the conception and development of the
policy. Using ‘snowball’ sampling these participants sug-
gested other relevant individuals for interview.14 We also
identified other stakeholders who had either previously
been involved in developing patient safety strategy nation-
ally or were known patient safety ‘experts.’ Interviews
were held in the participant’s workplace or over the tele-
phone and lasted between 40–75minutes. Interviews were
conducted between June and September 2019. Informed
consent was sought through the provision of a participant
information sheet with no refusals to participate.
Data analysis
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verba-
tim. Interview data was managed using NVivo version
11.0. We conducted qualitative analysis using a thematic
framework approach to code the data and identify pat-
terns and themes.14 Initially, open coding was used in the
analysis of relevant policy documents. The subsequent
coding framework was used alongside the relevant
policy and academic literature to inform the development
of the interview guide. This coding framework was fur-
ther adapted inductively with themes arising from the
interview data. The researchers independently read and
coded initial transcripts and met frequently to discuss
emerging themes until agreement on the main themes
categorized under the Kingdon framework was reached.
Results
Problem stream: Scale of the problem
The publication in 2000 of the UK Department of
Health’s (DH) Chief Medical Officer review of patient
safety in the NHS, An organisation with a memory,15
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Table 1. An overview of the Learning from Deaths policy.
Learning from Deaths framework
The policy comprises three key components: mortality governance, a methodology for reviewing deaths and engaging with families of
the bereaved.
Mortality governance: The policy requires Trust boards to adopt a series of principles and practices: reviewing deaths, reporting
internally and externally (publication through quarterly Quality Accounts), sharing and acting upon learning from investigations,
engaging with families of the bereaved and building the capacity of staff to undertake reviews. Boards are required to create a multi-
disciplinary Mortality Surveillance Group which will facilitate these practices. Furthermore, the Trust board’s Non-Executive
Director scrutinizes the mechanisms for reporting of mortality data and assures the publishing and sharing of relevant information
about the organization’s achievements and challenges.
Methodology for reviewing deaths: The policy recommends the adoption of systematic case sampling and review of patient deaths
using Structured Judgement Review (a robust and evidence-based methodology promoted by the Royal College of Physicians to
make judgements on safety and quality of care within the National Mortality Case Record Review Programme) or other suitable
tools.6 In instances in which deaths meet the threshold for further investigation, organizations will use the Serious Incident
Framework7 to assist them in making such decisions.
Engaging with families: Bereaved families should be given several opportunities to raise concerns about care. Additionally, family
involvement in the investigation of lapses of care should be sought, including reviewing reports. Furthermore, the policy emphasizes
the importance of disclosure to families through the Duty of Candour.
Table 2. Inquiry reports, reviews and responses, listed by date of publication.
Document title Publication date Document type Author
Learning from Bristol: The report of the public enquiry
into children’s heart surgery at the Bristol Royal
Infirmary 1984–1985
July 2001 Investigation report Kennedy, I.
Learning from Bristol: The Department of Health’s
response to the report of the Public Inquiry into
children’s heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary
1984–1995
January 2002 Government response Department of Health
Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust
public inquiry
February 2013 Investigation report Francis, R.
Patients first and foremost – initial government response
to Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust public
inquiry
March 2013 Government response Department of Health
Review into the quality of care and treatment provided by
14 hospital trusts in England: Overview report
July 2013 Review Keogh, B.
A promise to learn – a commitment to act: Improving the
safety of patients in England
August 2013 Advisory group report Berwick, D.
Independent review of deaths of people with a learning
disability or mental health problem in contact with
Southern Health NHS Foundation Trust from April
2011 to March 2015
December 2015 Investigation report Richardson, A. (Mazars)
Culture change in the NHS: Applying the lessons of the
Francis Inquiries
February 2015 Government response Department of Health
and Social Care
The report of the Morecambe Bay investigation March 2015 Investigation report Kirkup, B.
Learning not blaming: Government response to the
Freedom to Speak Up Consultation, the Public
Administration Select Committee Report Investigating
Clinical Incidents in the NHS and the Morecambe Bay
Investigation
July 2015 Government response Department of Health
and Social Care
Mazars report into mental health and learning disabilities
deaths in Southern Health NHS Foundation Trust – a
joint response from NHS Improvement, NHS England
and the Care Quality Commission
December 2015 Regulator response Executive bodies
Learning, candour and accountability. A review of the way
NHS trusts investigate deaths of patients in England
December 2016 Review Care Quality
Commission
National guidance on learning from deaths March 2017 Guidance National Quality Board
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was seminal. With it, came a growing recognition
among politicians and the wider public of the scale of
health care-related harm.
Highly publicized health care failures in the 1990s
and 2000s – including Bristol, Mid Staffordshire,
Morecambe Bay and Gosport – had raised concerns
that this harm was not being uncovered.16
Uncertainty centred not only on the numbers of pre-
ventable deaths, but also on the problems in health care
that led to these deaths and to the subpopulations most
affected. An influential investigation into deaths in
people with a learning disability indicated that this
population might be particularly vulnerable and that
governance mechanisms within mental health and com-
munity hospitals were weak in terms of identifying
poor quality care.17 As one interviewee told us:
Confidential inquiries found that deaths that should’ve
been reported, to a coroner, hadn’t been. And deaths
that should’ve been taken forward into safeguarding
inquiries hadn’t been, to protect people with learning
disabilities. . .One of the recommendations was for a
closer look at learning disabilities deaths on a national
scale. (Patient safety expert)
As well as concerns about levels of harm within the
NHS, investigations of high-profile failures exposed a
litany of potentially contributory factors, including
poor professional cultures, weak leadership, undue
focus on performance targets at the expense of safety
issues and failures to listen to concerns of staff and
family.2,3,18 As a report into the shortcomings at one
Trust board noted:
[I]t failed to tackle an insidious negative culture involv-
ing a tolerance of poor standards and a disengagement
from managerial and leadership responsibilities. This
failure was in part the consequence of allowing a
focus on reaching national access targets, achieving
financial balance and seeking foundation Trust status
to be at the cost of delivering acceptable standards of
care.3(p3)
This was accompanied by a lack of transparency, not
only in communicating with families but also in
approaches to investigations, which lacked depth and
independence.19 Weak clinical governance systems and
leadership insufficiently prioritized patient safety, with
safety information – including mortality statistics –
being used for assurance rather than scrutinized to pin-
point concerns.2,3,18,19 Interviewees remarked on the
stream of serious incident reports submitted to the
DH where evidence already existed on how these
could be prevented, indicating that lessons from patient
safety failures were not being learnt.
Policy stream: Rebalancing learning and
measurement
Examination of deaths to drive learning and improve-
ment in the quality of care has a long tradition in the
NHS, from local Mortality and Morbidity meetings to
investigation of incidents. Confidential Enquiries and
the National Patient Safety Agency’s National Incident
Reporting and Learning System identify areas for
change across the whole NHS. Many other processes
from clinical audits to targeted service reviews or
inspection by regulators generate information from
deaths to support learning and change. These systems
of surveillance and review have grown organically,
focused on certain specialties or areas of concern and
leave unexplored gaps,9 which present challenges to
developing a systematic understanding of patterns of
mortality, preventable harm and quality failings
across NHS organizations in order to target improve-
ment efforts.
As far back as the days of Florence Nightingale,
deaths have been used as comparative, bench-
marking measures for performance monitoring of
patient safety. Policymakers have made multiple
attempts to use organizational mortality data for this
purpose.10 The Hospital Standardized Mortality Ratio
(HSMR),11 became the first widely applied benchmark-
ing measure across acute hospitals during the 2000s.
Given the public nature of these data and their use in
oversight and regulation, hospital boards became pre-
occupied with finding ways to improve their ranking,
with time devoted to identifying administrative solu-
tions such as changes to coding practices, drawing
attention away from identifying and responding to
areas of poor care.19
By the mid-2000s, academics, clinicians and hospital
managers were questioning the utility of measures such
as HSMRs to drive improvements, identifying some
significant limitations with the approach.12
Interviewees revealed that in 2011, when the DH was
seeking a new measure to track the progress of hospital
safety improvement over time for the NHS National
Outcomes Framework, it too held reservations about
using measures such as HSMRs or the Summary
Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI). In 2012, a
study of 1000 deaths in English NHS acute hospitals
(PRISM) based on retrospective case record review
(RCRR) identified, for the first time, the scale of pre-
ventable deaths in the NHS, estimating around 12,000
such deaths annually.13 The DH began to consider if
this approach could be used in the National Outcomes
Framework.
PRISM gave an estimate to the level of deaths due to
problems in care, avoidable mortality, in the NHS. . .It
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put a number on how safe the NHS was. . .an easy to
understand number that was assessing the safety of
care within acute hospitals. So, we thought, why
don’t we explore that?. . .The creation of a metric and
a process to deliver that metric? So, we put a place-
holder into the outcomes framework that said we will
explore doing just that. (Policymaker)
As the policymakers moved forward with the develop-
ment of the new indicator, consultation with experts
highlighted limitations. Large samples, with multiple
reviewers, would be needed to ensure reliability,
making this an expensive programme to run.20 There
were also concerns that this approach would not fully
address missed opportunities to learn from deaths in
the NHS that were being hindered by fragmented iden-
tification and assessment.
A bunch of doctors in a room, having a chat, and the
structure to that chat was hugely variable. . .It was seen
as valuable for learning, but there was no structure to
that learning. It was reliant on the doctors in that room
remembering what their colleague had told them.
(Policymaker).
The need to address the lack of a systematized
approach to learning from deaths and to rebalance
the degree of effort among hospitals dedicated to
changing positions in HSMR/SHMI league tables led
to a gradual shift in thinking. Interviewees mentioned
that a move away from the dominant idea that mortal-
ity reviews would be used for safety measurement to
one recognizing that the method was more suited to
identification of clinical problems, had been suggested
by clinicians and academics. With more emphasis on
learning, interviewees recalled how they had hoped that
an examination of a wider scope of care in hospital
settings would result.
Subsequently, two new national programmes
focussed on learning were commissioned, the
Learning Disabilities Mortality Review Programme
(LeDeR) (2015) and the National Mortality Case
Record Review (NMCRR) programme (2016). The
NMCRR introduced a standardized approach to case
identification and review of care provided before death
in acute hospitals.6 LeDeR took a broader view, exam-
ining a longer period before death, with input from
multiple agencies and family members.21
Political stream: The impact of policy entrepreneurs
Kingdon describes a policy entrepreneur as someone
who uses his or her knowledge of processes to promote
their own policy objectives.8 Several interviewees
highlighted the role of Jeremy Hunt (Secretary of
State for Health and Social Care, 2012–2018) as a
major proponent in the development of the national
patient safety agenda, acting as a policy entrepreneur
in the development of LfD. His time in office coincided
with the publications of inquiries and investigations
into Mid Staffordshire, Morecambe Bay and
Southern Health.3,18,22 Interviewees explained how
Hunt’s desire to develop better methods for under-
standing safety in the NHS, prompted an interest in
the approaches used in industries such as aviation, as
well as in traditional health care settings. Hunt visited
the Virginia Mason Institute in the United States, an
organization known for its culture of learning, quality
improvement and openness. This was pivotal in height-
ening his interest in the transparent use of performance
indicators to drive safety improvement.
Mr Hunt was a firm believer in the power of transpar-
ency and exposing variation through data. . .Things like
league tables, indicators and producing top tens, dem-
onstrate to me that he fundamentally believed that if
you show everybody the range of variation and perfor-
mance of whatever exists, and expose it, and make it
really uncomfortable to be at the bottom, and then you
drive the [whole]. (Policymaker)
Interviewees remarked that when an enlarged PRISM
study20 (total 34 English acute Trusts) showed a lack of
association between HSMR/SHMI measures and
avoidable health care-related deaths identified by mor-
tality review, Hunt acknowledged the limitations of
these measures. But he continued to believe that pub-
licly available comparative data on avoidable deaths
for each NHS hospital would be a powerful stimulus
for improvement. Interviewees were keen to emphasise
how he maintained this position despite concerns from
leading clinicians and academics that such data are
likely to be misleading both due to measurement
biases and the accuracy of comparisons, given the
small numbers of such deaths normally found.
Several families affected by patient safety failures
worked assiduously to better understand the circum-
stances that led to serious harm and death of their
loved ones. Among them were James Titcombe, who
successfully lobbied for an independent inquiry at the
Morecambe Bay Trust, and Sara Ryan, who called for
an independent investigation at Southern Health.23,24
Taken together, families affected by patient safety fail-
ures can be seen as another policy entrepreneur.
Interviewees mentioned how these families contributed
to bringing NHS safety concerns to the notice of pol-
iticians while also seeking reassurance that measures
were in place to avoid the recurrence of such problems.
Affected families also pressured DH and NHS leaders
to hold organizations to account for failures.
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Interviewees explained how Jeremy Hunt expressed
deep concern for the affected families and requested
greater responsiveness from the NHS in providing
explanations of what went wrong. However, many
remained sceptical that this would happen. As one
interviewee told us:
The guidance will land in a Trust but will only be suc-
cessful if you’ve got the right culture and leadership to
embrace the spirit and the [fidelity] of that
guidance. . .Families have repeatedly told us. . .when
they challenged the factual accuracies of the indepen-
dent investigation, they were seen as vexatious com-
plainants. Really, really difficult. Couldn’t get past
the Trust board, couldn’t get past the governance or
compliance team. (Patient safety expert)
Confluence of the issues listed above
Interviewees suggested that a policy window appeared
in the aftermath of the publication of the independent
investigation into Southern Health,22 which exposed
the Trust’s failure to provide a systematic approach
to reviewing deaths where there was potential for sig-
nificant learning. The investigation also identified
many of the issues that had arisen in previous health
care scandals, including poor leadership and failures of
accountability which, in this Trust, had resulted in only
1% of unexpected deaths among patients with learning
disabilities undergoing investigation.
In an effort to determine whether these issues were
ubiquitous to the NHS, Jeremy Hunt commissioned
the CQC to undertake a review across a range of
NHS organizations. The subsequent report Learning,
candour and accountability, published in 2016, con-
firmed the fragmented and at times limited approach
to reviewing and investigating deaths, especially in
mental health and learning disabilities.5 The report
made wide-ranging recommendations for improve-
ment, including the implementation of a single frame-
work for learning from deaths across all NHS
organizations, incorporating guidance on governance,
sharing learning and involvement of families. These
were accepted in full by the DH:
The key contributory factor was the CQC report that
was commissioned off the back of the problems at
Southern Health, which showed that the NHS did
not have a clear policy for how it learned from the
deaths. . .Mr Hunt stood up in the House on the day
it was published and said that the NHS would have a
consistent policy to learn from deaths by April
2017 . . .which then precipitated some of the fastest pol-
icymaking I’ve seen. (Policymaker).
Interviewees outlined the various discussions held at
this juncture between key stakeholders in the DH and
the other executive bodies. Following the CQC report,
the DH asked the NQB, then under the joint chairman-
ship of the Medical Director of NHSE and the chair of
CQC, to develop a policy that addressed each of the
recommendations. Jeremy Hunt continued to press for
publication of the numbers of deaths attributable to
problems in care. This position created tensions
among those charged with policy creation. At the
time, the NQB commented on the need to balance
any mortality data component of the policy with
the focus on learning. Interviewees described how the
policy – built on learning-focused initiatives already
in place such as NMCRR and LeDeR - was obliged
to incorporate the additional requirement for publica-
tion of mortality data in Quality Accounts (report
about the quality of services offered by an NHS
organization), despite views among some individuals
in the executive agencies at the time that this could
be counterproductive.
Addressing wider governance issues, a Non-
Executive Director in each NHS organization was to
be assigned the role of scrutinizing implementation and
increasing the profile of the programme at Board
level.22 The emphasis on engagement and disclosure
with families and carers was seen as an imperative.
Interviewees referred to the direct involvement of fam-
ilies throughout the process of policy development as a
mechanism for ensuring their concerns were kept under
consideration.
Following a statement by Jeremy Hunt to
Parliament in late 2016 outlining the plans for a mor-
tality focussed programme for NHS organizations, in
March 2017 the NQB published the national LfD
Framework.4
Discussion
Applying Kingdon’s MSA has enabled us to obtain a
clearer understanding of the narrative for the evolution
of the LfD policy. Two interacting factors came togeth-
er to drive the issue of health care-related death up the
political agenda. The first was a long-standing concern
that poor care and patient harm were being missed.
This factor was heightened following a succession of
high-profile failures, with the concomitant loss of
opportunities to improve quality of care. The revealing
of the poor investigation into deaths at Southern
Health, coupled with the acknowledgement that the
lack of systematic examination of deaths was wide-
spread across the NHS, opened a window for policy
action.5,22
The LfD policymaking process shares common fea-
tures with previous national patient safety policies
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which impact on performance. Powell’s analysis of
DoC,25 based on MSA, also highlights how a long-
term concern (the need for transparency with patients
and families after harm) only reached the policymaking
agenda in the aftermath of an NHS failure (Mid
Staffordshire).3 Competing goals within a policy,
emerging from attempts multiple issues, can undermine
each other. For LfD there is a clear tension within the
policy between the desire to develop a culture of reflec-
tion and learning around deaths and the need for
accountability and performance management (the
requirement to publish rates of deaths due to problems
in care). For DoC, the broad expectation that the
policy could change both culture and behaviour was
limited by policy framing and regulatory oversight.
This resulted in the process becoming a ‘tick box’ exer-
cise within some NHS organizations, while obfuscating
the balance between individual professional and orga-
nizational responsibilities.26
In a similar way, the National Incident Reporting
and Learning System was established following revela-
tions of the scale of harm in the NHS, and was
designed to promote learning from that harm.15
Inherent tensions between perceptions of incident
occurrence as patient safety failures and high organiza-
tional reporting rates seen as an indicator of good
safety culture, have resulted in a system generating
over a million incident reports annually, the majority
related to ‘no harm’ events and few reporting common
adverse events.27 Failure to utilize the signals from ‘no
harm’ near misses or to adequately capture the scale of
harmful events are generally acknowledged to arise
from a lack of capacity for openness in inquiry, inves-
tigation and learning.28
This leads us to the second important factor
influencing design and implementation: the role of
policy entrepreneurs – in this case, Jeremy Hunt and
families affected by safety failures. Policymakers had
become convinced of the limits of mortality measures
to track safety at both local and national levels.
However, Jeremy Hunt remained a keen advocate of
their use. Guldbrandsson K et al. 29 describe several
attributes of a policy entrepreneur which were exempli-
fied by Jeremy Hunt and the affected families. Jeremy
Hunt’s credibility and authority ensured he had a
‘claim to hearing’ and the ability to leverage his ‘polit-
ical connections.’ The ‘sheer persistence’ of families in
voicing the appalling experiences of patients at the
hands of the NHS was also significant. Affected fami-
lies pursued more rigour in the investigation and trans-
parency in reporting of deaths in NHS Trusts, with
Hunt as the focus for their advocacy. While agreeing
to support affected families, Hunt also promoted the
use of RCRR for both learning about care quality and
enhancing performance management. In the creation of
this policy, the policy entrepreneurs were the promi-
nent factor in the introduction of policy elements that
may be at odds with the current consensus, such as
the value of publication of deaths caused by problems
in care.
Our analysis demonstrates the complexity of policy-
making in patient safety, often driven by expedient
responses to prominent health care failings. Whilst
the Southern Health review findings principally con-
cerned the quality and reporting standards for investi-
gations of unexpected deaths among people with a
learning disability, the LfD policy that emerged pro-
moted a broader surveillance of clinical care for
improvement and the publication of data on organiza-
tional avoidable deaths to encourage transparency.
Furthermore, expediency encouraged policymakers to
draw into the policy existing programmes that aligned
with its aims (in this case, LEDER and NMCRR),
despite neither being formally evaluated.
Limitations
There are two main limitations with this study. The
first is the several critiques of the MSA approach that
exist.30 These critiques include the tendency for MSA
to conflate agenda setting and decision-making pro-
cesses, the lack of standardization in interpretation of
components and subcomponents and the vague defini-
tion of a policy entrepreneur. Such issues, taken togeth-
er, may have hindered our analysis in unpacking the
complexity of factors that contributed to the develop-
ment of LfD. Nevertheless, we captured a range of
perspectives from both key informants involved with
the development of the policy and long-standing
experts in the field. This provided a nuanced under-
standing of policymaking that would not have been
obtained from the analysis of policy documents alone.
The second limitation is the relatively small numbers
of interviewees, the majority of whom were policy-
makers providing elite accounts.14 We acknowledge
that, had we interviewed a larger number of individu-
als, some of those individuals may have expressed alter-
native views to those reported in this paper.
Conclusions
The problems that patient safety policies seek to
address may have been recognized for many years,
only reach the top of the policy agenda at a time of
crisis. The policies that emerge tend to be multi-faceted,
responding to a range of issues, not only those arising
from the investigations of failures but also to others
causing concern across the system at the time. Using
‘off-the-shelf ‘solutions (NMCRR, LeDeR, DoC) to
generate the new policy and accelerate its delivery
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may have some advantages – rationalizing discrete pro-
grammes with which organizations are already familiar
under a single umbrella programme while mitigating
some of the negative impacts of ‘top-down’ policymak-
ing, increasing legitimacy, feasibility and support.31
However, with few of these policy components ever
having been formally evaluated, their likely outcomes
or those of the policy as a whole become difficult to
predict, particularly as they become layered on top of
others.
A future where patient safety policymaking is based
on evidence of successful interventions is desirable but,
given the politically sensitive nature of safety issues in the
NHS, this is unlikely to happen. In these circumstances,
it would seem imperative to continue to examine the
policymaking process in depth, in order to predict poten-
tial weaknesses and identify aspects that could be
strengthened to increase the likelihood that goals will
be met. Equal attention to creating a receptive milieu
within the NHS through continued focus on the promo-
tion of organizational learning from patient safety, sup-
ported by senior leaders who take ownership for
developing a learning culture locally, is also necessary.
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